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4. Corporations and structural linkages in 
world commerce 
John B. Davis and Joseph P. Daniels 
The Millennium Round of multilateral negotiations under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) confronts international trade and invest-
ment issues that are more complex and intractable than those in past rounds 
on account of increasing structural and policy interdependencies between the 
industrialized nations. Negotiators will have to think not only in terms of 
trade and investment between separate nations but also in terms of a system 
of production that operates across nations. In previous rounds, liberalizing 
international trade dominated the agendas. But international trade and invest-
ment have become more highly interlinked in the last decade, so that it has 
become difficult to consider trade liberalization apart from capital flows. At 
the same time, the issue of liberalizing international financial flows has been 
complicated by the massive expansion in the 1990s of portfolio capital flows 
and by financial crises in Asia and elsewhere. 
This chapter consequently examines international trade and investment 
linkages in terms of long-term structural change, tying this to corporate 
strategies responding to and underlying this change. Our principal subject is 
the theory of international production and the emerging system of interna-
tional production, and we comment on policy initiatives regarding trade and 
investment generated by increased recognition of their interlinked character. 
International production has been investigated within at least six branches 
of theory: international capital movements, trade, location, industrial organi-
zation, innovation, and the firm (Cantwell et al., 1986). Various theories of 
international production investigate different questions posed in theoretical 
branches they draw upon, some taking macroeconomic and others nllcro-
economic perspectives. The theory of international capital movements and 
foreign direct investment (FDI), especially where it bears on balance of 
payments and exchange rate effects, has mainly a macroeconomic focus, 
whereas the theory of the transnational corporation (TNC) is more micro-
economic. Both subjects, however, concern closely related matters, and 
accordingly understanding important issues in international production gen-
erally requires an eclectic approach, as argued by Dunning (1977, 1981, 
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1988). OUf focus is restricted to economics and international business, and 
does cover social and cultural issues. 
1 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
First we describe a number of key structural developments, to portray general 
trends in globalization. 1 These structural developments concern: the relation 
of world FOI flows to world trade flows; the dominance of Triad trade and 
FDI flows in the world economy; the importance of mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) in world FOI; and the geographical and sectoral distribution of FOI 
and cross-border M&A. We conclude this section with a discussion of the 
relationship between trade and investment as substitutes and/or complements. 
Next we tum to TNCs as a principal vehicle of globalization processes, 
and explain how the strategies of major firms in the world economy are 
shaped by their need to operate in foreign locations. The current state of trade 
negotiations has given added importance to international finns expanding 
through FOr. We then emphasize that firm search and deliberation costs, as 
transaction costs, are particularly important to TNCs, and argue that TNCs 
become 'embedded' in host social and business networks as they establish 
foreign affiliates. This 'embeddedness' helps to account for the structural 
changes and developments described earlier, particularly the concentration of 
FOI in the Triad, where business networks are generalJy highly developed. To 
illustrate the implications of this for the relationship between trade and in-
vestment, we return to the topic of trade and investment as substitutes or 
complements, and discuss three cases showing how firms' FDI affects exports 
and imports. 
Finally, we discuss economic policy toward FDI and TNCs, particularly in 
connection with recent unsuccessful efforts to establish the Multilateral Agree-
ment on Investment (MAI). We first consider debate about the national loyalties 
of TNCs and the impact of liberalized capital flows. We then distinguish 
between short-term and long-term investment flows, and argue that liberali-
zation of the latter can be in the interest of host countries as TNCs become 
embedded in them. We then discuss the difference between national competi-
tiveness and the competitiveness of a nation's firms, and make a general case 
for an international agreement at least along the lines of the MAI. This 
section closes with an argument in favour of a collection of piecemeal changes 
that taken together will accomplish much of what was intended by the MAl, 
and will also create an agenda for more comprehensive reform. 
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2 EVIDENCE OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system ushered in' a new era of globaliza-
tion, with capital market liberalization beginning in the mid-1970s in the 
United States and Canada. The process continued, though unevenly, through-
out the remainder of the twentieth century as other developed nations began 
removing and reducing capital barriers in the 1980s (Williamson and Mahar, 
1998). Many developing countries followed suit, although it was a forward-
reverse-forward process for some. The risks and rewards became clear as ,the 
century came to a close. Long-term capital flows were concentrated in the 
developed nations, increasing their global production capacity and providing 
access to lucrative consumer markets. Developing and emerging nations gained 
jobs created by FDI, but also suffered extreme financial crises created by hot-
money or portfolio flows. 
Meanwhile the growth of global trade gradually declined, while foreign 
direct investment increased. At the same time, different stages of the produc-
tion processes moved to different world locations, in a 'disintegration' of 
production as a means to greater global integration (Feenstra, 1998). In this 
section we focus on developments in trade and capital markets over the last 
decade. We present the stylized facts only, relating these patterns to strategies 
and theories of transnationals in the following section. 
2.1 World FDI Flows Relative to World Trade Flows 
In spite of declining transportation costs and f;ldvances in telecommunications 
technology, the rate of growth in world exports has decreased during the last 
thirty years. As shown in Table 4.1, five-year growth rates in world exports 
have declined from a high of 24 per cent in the early 1970s to single digit 
gains in the 1990s. The long-delayed conclusion to the Uruguay Round of 
Table 4.1 Periodic growth of world FDI and exports 
FDI inflows FDI outflows World exports 
1971-1975 19.8 17.3 24 
1976-1980 18.5 17.4 18.1 
1981-1985 2.1 2.4 -0.56 
1986-1990 31.5 34.6 14.5 
1991-1995 11.3 9.2 8.3 
1996-1998 25.6 22.8 2.2 
Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2000). 
-
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trade negotiations, the loss of Presidential fast-track authority in the United 
States, recent WTO skirmishes, and the lack of G7 leadership suggests that 
further gains in world trade are more likely to come from regional and 
bilateral agreements than from multilateral pacts. 
Capital flows have expanded over this same period in a climate of liberali-
zation and gradual hannonization of national tax policies and accounting 
rules. FDI rates of growth now significantly surpass trade flow rates of 
growth. As illustrated in Table 4.1, the change begins after the worldwide 
recession and the Latin American debt crises of the early 1980s. Further 
gains in economic liberalization are likely to stem from the expansion of 
international production fuelled by high rates of FDI as opposed to increased 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
2.2 Triad Trade and FDI Flows 
Figure 4.1 illustrates Triad and rest-of-world (ROW) shares of world exports. 
During the last thirty years, the Triad has consistently contributed 60 to 70 
per cent of total world exports. Figure 4.2 shows inward FDI flows for the 
Triad and the ROW for the last thirty years. Though the average inward FDI 
flow to the Triad is 60 to 70 per cent of the total, these inflows demonstrate a 
fair amount of variability, perhaps reflecting the Latin American debt crises 
of the 1980s and the financial crises of the late 1990s. and reveal a short-lived 
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Source: UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics (2000). 
Figure 4.1 World exports: Triad proportion of total 
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Figure 4.2 Inward FDI flows: Triad proportion of total 
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Figure 4.3 Outward FDI flows: Triad proportion of total 
interest in global capacity diversification in developing economies. Of par-
ticular interest is the small fraction of PDI inflows to Japao, indicating the 
relatively closed nature of its economy. 
---"-...~-- - - ------------ -----------"-- --------- -----------
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The Triad's share of FDl outflows, shown in Figure 4"3, also demonstrates 
greater variability than their export share; with decreases occurring in the 
early 1980s and mid-1990s" The thirty-year average of the Triad, however, 
remains above 90 per cent. The general or overall decline in the Triad's share 
may reflect efforts of developing economies to integrate globally and to 
increase worldwide capacity and market share. 
In general, then, the Triad's dominance of trade flows is reproduced in its 
dominance of FDI flows, as the Triad is the principal source and host of FDl 
flows. 
2.3 FDIM&A 
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions accounted for most FDI flows in the 
late 1990s. More favourable tax conditions, relaxation of regulations and 
labour laws, and a changing shareholder culture spurred dramatic increases in 
cross-border M&A activity. From 1996 to 1999, as shown in Figure 4.4, 
M&A inflows to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) nations increased over 280 per cent to US$718 billion, while 
M&A outflows from the OECD nations increased over 200 per cent to US$767 
billion. In 1999 alone, cross-border M&A inflows and outflows increased 
approximately 50 per cent. 
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Source: United Nations 1999 World Investment Report. 
Figure 4.4 OEeD international M&A ($US billions) 
As shown in Figure 4.5, the majority of M&A deals were concentrated in 
the Triad. According to OECD data, in 1999 European companies led in 
M&A deals. In the same year, the United Kingdom completed more acquisi-
tions than any other nation, accounting for 30 per cent of global M&A value 
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1999 
Figure 4.5 International M&A in OEeD countries: Triad share vftotal 
(Wessel, 2000), while the United States continued to attract more M&A 
purchasers than any other nation, capturing over 35 per cent of the value of 
global M&A purchases, 
2.4 Geographical and Sectoral Distribution of FDI Flows and Cross-
BorderM&A 
The recent shift in FDI flows and M&A to the Triad nations relative to the 
rest of the world is illustrated in greater detail in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 below, 
which provide the geographical distribution of FDI inflows and cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. We chose not to combine these two measures (that 
Table 4.2 Geographical distribution of FDI inflows (percentage of total 
inflows) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Developed nations 61.0 57.7 63.4 58.8 58.9 71.5 
European Union 35.0 30.6 35.1 30.4 27.2 35.7 
Other European nations 0.9 2.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.2 
North America 22.0 21.0 20.7 23.9 26.0 32.6 
Other developed 3.1 3.4 5.7 2.8 3.8 2.0 
Developing nations 35.9 39.9 32.3 37.7 37.2 25.8 
Transitional nations 3.1 2.3 4.3 3.5 4.0 2.7 
Source; United Nations [999 World Investment Report. 
.. 
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Table 4.3 Geographical distribution of cross-border M&As, by seller 
(percentage of total) 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Developed nations 60.3 65.8 71.0 67.9 68.4 85.9 
European Union 31.9 29.7 31.5 27.9 39.1 40.6 
Other European nations 0.4 1.3 0.6 1.8 1.4 1.5 
North America 24.8 32.0 31.2 29.6 22.6 39.8 
Other developed 3.2 2.7 7.6 8.5 5.4 4.0 
Developing nations 30.0 31.1 22.2 30.4 28.0 12.4 
Transitional nations 9.8 2.5 6.8 1.5 2.9 1.6 
Source: United Nations 1999 World Investment Report. 
is to express M&A as a percentage of FOI flows, as is often done), as M&A 
may be financed by means other than foreign direct investment, thereby 
overstating the importance of M&A as a percentage of FDr. Nonetheless, the 
data illustrate a significant increase in FDI inflows in the developed nations, 
and in the Triad in particular, at the expense of developing nations. As in the 
previous section, the increase in FDI corresponds with the dramatic increase 
in M&A activity in the developed nations. 
Table 4.2 indicates that the developed countries increased their share of 
world FDI inflows by an additional 13 per cent and their share of world cross-
border M&A by an additional I7 per cent at the expense of developing and 
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Figure 4.6 Cross-border M&A by sector (percentage of total) 
78 The World Trade Organization in the new global economy 
transitional nations. This trend is best understood in light of the sectoral 
distribution of M&A deals. Figure 4.6 illustrates the distribution of cross-
border M&A by primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors. The growing 
importance of tertiary M&A reflects, in paa·ticular, recent deals in banking, 
finance, and related services conducted almost exclusively among the devel-
oped nations. 
2.5 The Relationship Between Foreign Direct Investment and Trade 
Flows 
Further international economic integration is likely to result from increases in 
international production capacity due to larger capital flows rather than the 
expansion of world exports resulting from the reduction of trade barriers. 
What might this imply about the relationship between capital flows and trade 
flows? Not too long ago, business economists believed global expansion 
occurred along two relatively independent routes: through trade or through 
foreign direct investruent. Global strategies were simple in that a firm could 
expand internationally by exporting goods and services or by FDI and pro-
ducing abroad. Recent theoretical and empirical research, however, suggests 
that the relationship between trade and FDI is more complex, and that trade 
and foreign direct investment complement each other. FOI may spur greater 
aanounts of trade and trade may spur greater amounts of FOI. 
Fantagne and Pajot (1997) provide estimates of the impact of bilateral FDI 
flows and FDI stocks on bilateral trade flows, controlling for such things as 
market distance, income levels, and market sizes. Their evidence suggests 
that Japan's exports to the United States are 149 per cent higher than they 
would have been in lieu of bilateral FOI flows, while US exports to Japan are 
86 per cent higher than they would have been without the bilateral FOI flows. 
FDI flows between Japan and the United States contribute to a bilateral trade 
deficit for the United States, as a greater amount of exports to the United 
States are generated than exports to Japan2 In contrast, the bilateral FDI 
relationships between Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom 
generate approximately equal amounts of imports and exports, and do not 
accordingly explain trade imbalances between the countries.3 This shows that 
FOI flows may either complement or substitute for trade flows, depending, 
presumably, on the nature and purposes of the FDI. Below in Section 3, in 
connection with our discussion of firm strategies, we consider three types of 
cases in which FDI has specific implications for trade flows. 
l 
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3 UNDERSTANDING THE EVIDENCE IN TERMS OF THE 
STRATEGIES OF TNCs 
In this section we seek to explain the structural relationships underlying the 
data on trade and investment in terms of the strategies of major firms in the 
international economy. According to the 1999 World Investment Report (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Investment, 1999), though TNCs include 
over 500,000 foreign affiliates established by some 60,000 parent companies, 
a relatively small number of such firms have dominated international produc-
tion since 1990, with the list of the top 100 firms virtually unchanged since 
then, of which 90 per cent are from Triad countries. While the growth of the 
largest TNCs does not tell the whole story about the globalization of produc-
tion, their operations are central to it. They dominate world markets for oil, 
minerals and agricultural products, and playa leading role in the globaliza-
tion of manufacturing production and services. They also create production 
and distribution networks in both Triad and non-Triad nations in which small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) operate. 
3.1 Change in the Relationship between Trade and Investment 
The data above regarding the growth rates of trade and FDI over the period 
1985-1999 provide evidence of a change in the relationship between trade 
and investment in the world economy. Our understanding of this development 
is that uncertain prospects for future trade negotiations have provided an 
important stimulus for higher levels of FDI. Until the Uruguay Round, liber-
alization of international trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the WTO principally targeted the reduction of tariff barri-
ers. But the success of these earlier negotiations created incentives for countries 
to increase their reliance on non-tariff trade barriers as their principal means 
of protection. Moreover, because non-tariff barriers are quantitatively and 
qualitatively more complex than tariffs, multilateral negotiations for their 
reduction have been, and are likely to continue to be, less successful than 
negotiations over reductions in more traditional barriers. The protracted na-
tnre of the Uruguay Round, which took up non-tariff barriers, and the largely 
failed 1999 ministerial talks in Seattle seem to bear this out. Thus, both 
because countries may rely more heavily on non-tariff barriers, and because 
progress in reducing such barriers is likely to be slow, firms now have good 
reason to look upon foreign investment as a key means of continuing expansion. 
There may have been a period in the heyday of earlier GATT negotiations 
when many believed that international economic integration would soon pro-
duce a world in which markets for goods, services, and factors of production 
were perfectly integrated. It has now become apparent that the traditional 
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paradigm of a world economy divided into nation states and segmented 
markets will not be replaced by a borderless world in the foreseeable future 
(cf. Helliwell, 1998). Trade flows will continue to encounter numerous obsta-
cles, some created by national policies (tariffs and quotas, regulations, national 
standards, competition policies, and government procurement); some by dif-
ferences in culture, language, and custom; some by geography (affecting 
transportation and communication); some by collusive practices of national 
firms; and others by first entrant advantages (economies of scale, learning by 
doing, control of distribution systems~ privileged access to inputs, and cus-
tomer loyalties). All of these give rise to imperfect competition, market 
segmentation, and international price and cost differences. But firms that 
engage in FOI can take advantage of the opportunities of such segmentation 
and thus arguably the dramatic growth in FOI since the mid-1980s reflects 
the decision (and the ability) of TNCs to exploit foreign profit opportunities 
and locational advantages not available through export strategies alone. 
This conclusion may be understood in terms of two of the leading theories. 
First, it recalls Hymer's emphasis on structural market imperfections and 
market power approach (Hymer, 1976), more in regard to the advantages 
these create for firms than regarding the removal of conflict between them. 
But an emphasis on market segmentation also demonstrates the importance 
of transactions costs, since firms encountering obstacles to trade that invest 
abroad presumably regard transactions costs as greater than the costs of 
relocation and organizing production through direct managerial control. Ob-
stacles to trade, whether created or natural, cause transaction costs which 
may be internalized through PDI. We agree with Buckley (Buckley, 1990, 
p. 658) that 'the internalisation and market power explanations ... should not 
be viewed as mutually exclusive or competing theories but should be com-
bined to give a full and rich explanation of the growth of multinational firms.' 
At the same time, we believe there are advantages in using the transactions 
cost framework to account for both the concentration of world FOI in the 
Triad (Section 2.2 above) and also the high degree of M&A in world FOI 
(Section 2.3 above). The Hymer framework, with its focus on imperfect 
competition, would lead us to expect developing countries to be an especially 
important destination for FOI, since their markets tend to be less competitive 
than those in developed countries. But the evidence indicates that developing 
countries have received a relatively small share of PDI since the mid-1980s. 
Further, if developing countries were an important destination for FDT, we 
would expect a higher share of FOI to be greenfield investment, both because 
of fewer opportunities in developing countries for M&A and because of 
greater opportunities for investments targeting unexploited resources. But the 
evidence indicates that greenfield investment, though still important, has 
been relatively unimportant in world PDI since the mid-1980s. Thus in the 
-----.---- ---------------------------------- --- -------
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section that follows we rely on a transactions cost framework to explain both 
the concentration of FDI in the Triad countries and the importance of M&A 
in total world POI. We use this framework in terms of search and deliberation 
costs taken as a general form of transactions costs. 
3.2 Search and Deliberation Costs as Transactions Costs 
Another way of understanding the obstacles to trade described above is in 
terms of cross-border information discontinuities that create significant search 
and deliberation problems for TNCs (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999, ch. 4). 
Within countries, information flows tend to be smoother and more homoge-
neous on account of shared market regulations and culture. Across borders, 
information flows tend to be irregular and interrupted, so that there may be 
significant interpretation problems, as different systems of regulation and 
culture come into contact. In general. search problems arise when firms seek 
to identify potential customers and suppliers as exchange partners. The costs 
of search increase not only as potential exchange partners become more 
physically dispersed, but also because across the international economy cul-
ture, language, and custom are different. In general, deliberation problems 
arise in connection with firms' assessments of the reliability and trustworthi-
ness of potential exchange partners. The costs of deliberation rise as it becomes 
more difficult to reverse past decisions, implying that minimizing delibera-
tion costs calls for stable relationships with exchange partners. Clearly domestic 
markets typically involve both lower search and deliberation costs for firms. 
We explain this by saying that domestic markets involve lower costs because 
firms are embedded (Granovetter, 1985) in established social, cultural, and 
business networks that help them identify and evaluate those with whom they 
do business. The lesson this implies is that success in international business 
similarly depends upon firms becoming embedded in social, cultnral, and 
business networks in foreign locations that reduce search and deliberation 
costs. We use this insight to emphasize the importance to TNCs of internaliz-
ing search and deliberation costs as a general form of transactions costs 
through cross-border M&A, POI, and strategic alliances. 
The modern theory of the internationalization of markets in the literature 
on international production (see Buckley and Casson, 1976) draws on Coase's 
(1937) original contribution establishing transactions cost analysis. One im-
portant emphasis in this literature is on intangible assets such as technology 
that are particularly costly to exchange in arm's-length transactions, and are 
consequently important candidates for transactions costs internalization. In 
the international economy, TNCs thus internalize their acquisitions of tech-
nology through investment in foreign research and development (R&D) 
facilities, particularly through M&A with foreign firms that already possess 
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desirable tacit capabilities that have been organizationally embedded in those 
firms through collective learning processes. There is a spectrum of such 
possible arrangements (cf. Kay, 1983). At one end are joint ventures and 
decentralized TNCs in which internal markets regulated by transfer prices 
have replaced external markets (Rugman, 1981). At the other end of the 
spectrum are globally integrated multinationals with foreign affiliates in pro-
duction and distribution in which control over all divisions and operations is 
centralized and hierarchical (Williamson, 1975). 
Acquisitions of technology, of course, account for only one category of 
exchange partners for TNCs. Putting aside the transformation of business 
through technological change, firms also have relationships with suppliers, 
subcontractors, distributors, labour and management personnel, consultants, 
and financial institutions in carrying out routine operations. All of these 
relationships are likely to differ in important respects in foreign country 
locations as compared to home country locations. The 'foreign-ness' of these 
relationships, however, is much the same as relationships aimed at technol-
ogy acquisition. Just as many important technologies involve intangible assets 
and are embedded in firms through collective learning processes, so the 
relationships with most exchange prutners, domestic or foreign, presuppose 
tacit understandings and expectations that guide these relationships and get 
embedded over an extended period of time. 
When films operate in their home locations, they often take these tacit 
features of exchange for granted. In foreign locations, however, they become 
sharply aware of the role that tacit understandings and expectations play 
between business partners. TNCs, we suggest, are firms that have learned 
how to identify the implicit features of exchange relationships in foreign 
countries, and then fonn relationships with suppliers, subcontractors, dis-
tributors, and so on. In doing so, they internalize transactions costs involved 
in operating supply and distribution chains outside of their horne countries, 
where those transactions costs might be labelled business and economic 
network transactions costs, and are closely associated with search and delib-
eration costs of doing business there. As Rugman puts it (Rugman, 2000, 
pp. 215ff), TNCs serve as 'flagship firms' by operating at the hub of a busi-
ness network or cluster. Long-term contracts are established with four basic 
kinds of partners - key suppliers, key customers, key competitors, and the 
non-business infrastructure - and the whole constitutes a relatively settled 
business system that internalizes an entire structure of transactions costs, not 
just transactions costs on a partner-by-partner basis. 
The behaviour of US TNCs in manufacturing is illustrative. Although in 
1990 the top 50 US TNCs accounted for nearly 40 per cent of US manufac-
turing exports, exports were not a large share of these firms' overall foreign 
sales, which were carried out by these firms' foreign affiliates (Fortune, 1991, 
--"--~----------------------------------"-----------------------------------------------
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p" 59)" In general (see Rangan and Lawrence, 1999, pp.34ft), US TNCs 
appear to ship about half of all their exports on an intrafinn basis to their 
affiliates abroad. Moreover, a very significant share of these exports are 
inputs awaiting further value-added rather than finished products ready for 
sale. Some might suppose from this that these US firms have thus simply 
located production facilities in other countries, and carry out manufacturing 
operations there with home produced inputs. In fact, however, US input 
content in sales by foreign affiliates in developed economics is typically low, 
now amounting to about 10 per cent or less (Rangan and Lawrence, 1999, 
p. 65)4 Thus, US TNCs rely on their developed country foreign affiliates -
not home exports - for foreign sales, and focus on intrafirm exports of inputs 
to those affiliates, but then rely primarily upon local sourcing of inputs in 
generating products for final sale. We believe this illustrates the embeddedness 
of TNCs, especially in developed economies in which the pervasiveness of 
search and deliberation costs requires that firms internalize transactions costs 
on a systemic, wide-ranging basis. 
The point stands out more clearly when we compare the practices of US 
TNCs in developing countries. While these firms rely on their foreign affiliates 
and less and less on home exports for their foreign sales, when we consider 
intrafirm exports of inputs to those affiliates, it turns out that TNCs depend less 
on local sQurcing in developing countries. Thus, US input content in 1982 for a 
selection of developing economies ranges between IS and 50 per cent (Rangan 
and Lawrence, 1999, p. 83). In our view, this reflects the lesser extent to which 
developing economies have established complex social and economic networks 
into which US TNCs must insert themselves in order to internalize search and 
deliberation transaction costs and carry out profitable transactions. Clearly 
business and economic networks exist in such economies. However, their number 
and variety of possible exchange partners do not compare with networks in 
developed economies. Thus we suppose that search and deliberation costs are 
lower in these economies, so that the expansion of TNCs into these economies 
reflects less the need to internalize such costs and perhaps more the pursuit of 
market power advantages a La Hymer. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the 
general pattern since 1982 is rising local content in US TNC foreign affiliate 
production. This suggests that the development of those economies, plus possi-
bly technological spillover effects on local business networks (see below), is 
slowly creating a business environment for TNCs in developing economies 
guided by the same factors as those in developed ones. 
We would not want to suggest by the analysis above, however, that the 
social and economic frameworks into which TNCs enter are static in nature 
and unaffected by this entry. A long literature dating from the earliest studies 
of TNCs has examined the transformative effects these firms have on local 
economies. Consider the case of technology transfer. Dunning (1958) pio-
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neered this work in his study of the operations of British affiliates of US 
TNCs as compared to their British-owned counterparts. The former were 
generally more successful than the latter, and Dunning argued that this was 
due to the capacity of TNCs to transfer often intangible assets (technology, 
marketing, managerial skills) to their affiliates. Moreover, after a time the 
British firms were able to catch up with the US affiliates, demonstrating the 
spillover character of the original transfers. 
One way that this spillover may occur is through transformation of TNC-
supplier and TNC-distributor relationships. Seeking low-cost input supplies 
and efficient distribution networks, TNCs transfer organizational methods 
and technologies to their business partners, who then re-employ these meth-
ods and technologies in their business relationships with domestic firms. The 
latter then change their methods of organization and technologies, and so on. 
Thus FDI has interrelated transformative effects on host countries' technol-
ogy levels and systems of business organization. Not surprisingly, developing 
countries have sought to take advantage of this by imposing local content 
requirements on TNCs (now generally banned by the WTO under the Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Measures or TRIMs). Other 'downstream' spillovers 
include local human capital development (Borenszstein et al., 1994). Finally, 
a recent OECD study (2000, p. 25) emphasizes the transformative effects of 
TNC activity in terms of the self-perpetuating nature of FDl. Not only do 
competing TNCs tend to follow one another into foreign locations, but they 
are also likely to induce local investments in supply chains and other business 
service providers. This is important for understanding the emerging role for 
SMEs operating in conjunction with TNCs in developed countries. 
How, then, do these conclusions relate to the structural trends presented in 
Section 2 above? What stands out is the concentration of trade and invest-
ment in the Triad, the importance of M&A, and (to a lesser extent) the rising 
importance of tertiary production in FDI activity. Based on the discussion 
above, our argument regarding these trends is two-sided. First, though the 
obstacles to FDI as eontrasted with domestic investment place a speeial 
burden on TNCs to overcome cost disadvantages in entering foreign loca-
tions, that burden may be eased through exploitation of search and deliberation 
transaction cost savings when these firms succeed in embedding themselves 
in foreign business and economic networks. We thus conclude that because 
these networks are more highly developed in the Triad, the opportunities for 
expansion there are greater. Second, once embedded in these networks, our 
analysis suggests that there is considerable promise of profitable returns on 
TNC investments, because highly developed business networks offer firms 
the flexibility to regularly adjust their commitments with exchange partners, 
which should be to their advantage. We believe the level of M&A FDI in the 
L 
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Triad particularly reflects this. The embeddedness/transactions cost frame-
work, then, takes us a considerable way toward understanding firm strategies 
responding to and underlying recent structural changes in the world economy. 
3.3 Firm Strategies Producing FD I and Trade Flow Linkages 
With our conclusions about TNC strategies developed above, we return to the 
topic of whether trade and investment are substitutes andlor complements, 
and describe three cases in which firm investment decisions have implica-
tions for countries' exports and imports. The importance of the topic lies in 
how countries assess the costs and benefits of liberalizing capital flows when 
the effects include changes in their trade accounts. In our view, one obstacle 
to successful international negotiations over capital flows liberalization is 
uncertainty regarding whether higher FOI creates trade deficits. The case has 
been made more frequently for capital-exporting countries, but it has also 
been made for capital-importing countries. Here we do not provide a compre-
hensive analysis of the subject, but rather suggest by our three cases that the 
effects of FDI on trade depend upon the purposes for which FDI is carried 
out. Trade and investment may thus be substitutes andlor complements for 
one another according to the circumstances involved, and we may accord-
ingly rule out the impact of FDI on countries' trade balances as a policy 
concern. 
First, consider perhaps the simplest type of relationship between FDI and 
trade. A finn moves production from a home location to a foreign location, 
and replaces its home exports with foreign affiliate sales. The home country 
trade account may be more or less unaffected, if some home input suppliers 
now export to the new foreign location, and prior imports of inputs to the 
home location now fall. The host country may lose exports if it was an input 
supplier to the original location of production in the home country, and see 
some added input imports, but may also gain exports if the new plant em-
ploys new technologies that make it possible to add capacity to export. Thus 
the overall effects depend on the character of the original investment, and 
there does not appear to be a general relationship between FOI and trade. 
Second, consider the case of a developed country firm that moves labour-
intensive production to a foreign location, and then imports the output for 
final assembly at home. Since final output is now cheaper, the export capabil-
ity of the finn is enhanced. The horne country may thus increase its imports 
and also its exports. At the same time, the country to which the labour-
intensive production was relocated now has higher exports. But if, as is not 
unlikely, it purchases the now relatively cheaper output of the home country 
firm, then its imports rise as well. Thus the ultimate impact on trade of FDI 
again depends upon the kind of FDI and the circumstances involved. 
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Third, consider the trade effects of using FDI to outsource stages of the 
production process in pursuit of cost advantages in foreign locations (Feenstra, 
1998; Davis and Daniels, 2000). Though attention is often focused on the 
stages of production that leave a horne country, equally important for under-
standing the trade effects of FDI are those stages of production that it retains. 
When a country retains stages of the production process in which it lacks 
comparative advantage, the possible comparative advantage it possesses in 
other stages may be concealed by a focus on whether the final product is cost 
competitive. Conversely, when a country relocates stages of production in 
which it is not cost competitive, say, simple assembly in developed countIies, 
then those remaining stages in which it is especially cost competitive, say, 
marketing and design stages, become a more obvious source of export earn-
ings. In these circumstances, imports rise when the output of foreign assembly 
operations is brought back to the home country to produce the final product, 
but exports may also rise if firms exploit the foreign marketability of business 
services in which they have comparative advantage. The increasing impor-
tance of tertiary cross-border M&A may reflect this re-positioning of firms in 
developed countries in the higher value-added stages of the production pro-
cess. Thus again, the ultimate impact on trade of FDI depends on the character 
of the investment. 
3.4 Policy Toward FDI and TNCs 
TNCs have been characterized as firms that have shed their home-nation 
identities and operate essentially as stateless entities (Ohmae, 1990). This has 
led to a concern that TNCs will locate operations wherever in the world they 
are able to minimize costs, making it increasingly difficult for nations to tax 
TNCs, thus resulting in a shifting oftax burden from capital to labour (Rodrik, 
1997). The implication of these views and arguments is that further liberali-
zation of regulations on capital flows and entry of foreign firms into domestic 
markets and on FD!, such as was involved in the efforts within the OECD to 
develop an MAl, is undesirable (see, for example, Braunstein and Epstein, 
1999).' On the other side of the debate, Swank (1999) has argued that inter-
national capital mobility and the internationalization of capital markets need 
not jeopardize the institutions of the welfare state, since democratic institu-
tions that facilitate collective representation of interests may structure 
governmental responses to TNC strategies. Relatedly, others have argued that 
the development of new forms of corporate governance as promoted by a 
variety of NOOs can also help accommodate the international economy to 
significant social and environmental needs (for example, Nadkarni, 1999). 
To sort out this debate, we first emphasize the difference between FD! and 
portfolio investment, then discuss the difference between national competi-
---- -- - ------------------------------
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tiveness and the competitiveness of a nation's firms, and finally close with an 
argument in favour of the ultimate objectives of the MAL OUf argument is 
that because FDI has a stabilizing influence on national economies, and 
because the competitiveness of nations is enhanced by inward FDI flows, 
careful liberalization of long-term capital flows, such as was intended by the 
MAl, is desirable. However, the venue and form of such an agreement remain 
an issue. 
3.5 FDI versus Portfolio Investment 
It is important to emphasize the economic difference between portfolio and 
FDI flows. Portfolio flows as a non-ownership, liquid form of investment, are 
easily reversible, whereas FDI as a relatively illiquid, ownership fonn of invest-
ment typically involves long-term commitment. Significant portfolio inflows 
can, and often do, overwhelm a nation with an inefficient or under-developed 
system of financial intennediaries, and the allocation of this new source of 
liquidity may often be economically unsound. Worse, as learned in the 1994-
95 Mexican and 1997 East Asian financial crises, when portfolio flows slow or 
reverse, the system of intermediaries then often becomes illiquid and a finan-
cial crisis may ensue (see Chang and Velasco, 1998). In the case of Mexico and 
the rest of the western hemisphere's emerging economies, portfolio flows in-
creased relative to FDI from 1990 to 1994. Following the crisis that began in 
December 1994, the outflow of portfolio capital resulted in a 112 per cent 
decline and overall negative net portfolio flows for the region. When portfolio 
flows reverse in one nation, they often trigger a crisis in the entire region, as 
seen in the cases of Mexico and Thailand. Empirical work by Glick and Rose 
(1998) indicates that currency crises affect 'clusters' of nations, working through 
established trade channels. Hence, over-reliance on portfolio capital can be 
destabilizing for individual countries and entire regions. 
In contrast, FDI appears to be a stabilizing factor. When TNCs establish 
foreign affiliates or enter into strategic alliances, they seek long-term com-
mitments. Search costs are reduced, because participation in host country 
networks transfers information within the network regarding customers and 
suppliers that is not available to firms engaged in arm's-length trade. Delib-
eration costs are reduced, when long-term relationships reduce the need to 
regularly evaluate potential exchange partners. Thus one would not expect 
TNCs to enter and exit foreign countries with high degrees of frequency. 
Indeed, as it is more difficult to enter into foreign business and market 
networks than in home countries, exit from established facilities and opera-
tions seems less likely in foreign locations. Against the argument that tax 
costs create footloose TNCs, it seems that tax costs are a relatively minor 
element in decision-making regarding the location of production. FDI and 
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TNCs, then, appear to have a stabilizing influence on the economies in which 
they locate, bringing income and employment to those economies. 
3.6 National Competitiveness versus a Nation's Firms' 
Competitiveness 
Despite arguments that TNCs have dissociated themselves from their national 
origins, many still believe that national economic strength is linked to the 
success of a country's TNCs. Thus whether or not these firms are internation-
ally competitive is an important measure of whether nations are competitive 
in the world economy. But there are good reasons to think this emphasis on a 
nation's firms is misplaced. Reich (1990) asks us to consider the positive 
impact that foreign finns have on a country's employment and income when 
they locate production or distribution subsidiaries in that country. Of course 
the opposite impact occurs when foreign finns leave a country, but Reich 
thinks that seeing exit as an inevitable consequence of entry misconceives the 
nature of FDI. Firms invest in foreign markets because they perceive advan-
tages to doing so: skilled workforces, good distribution networks, developed 
supply chains, access to finance, and so on. A country that invests in educa-
tion, research, training, and infrastructure, then, can expect to continually 
attract FDI, enabling it to maintain high levels of employment and income. If 
we add the benefits of technology spillovers discussed above, we might 
imagine a virtuous spiral of growth and investment, whereby domestic invest-
ment and FDI continually reinforce one another. 
Reich's argument is mostly pitched at a macroeconomic level. Our argu-
ment emphasizes the factors affecting firms' decision-making regarding where 
they wish to locate their subsidiaries and develop strategic alliances. In virtue 
of the importance of business and economic networks in a foreign venture, 
firms will generally be reluctant to abandon commitments to an interlocked 
complex of exchange partners, both because of the original cost of building 
up that set of commitments and because of the anticipated cost of having to 
re-establish similar commitments elsewhere. Seen in this light, Reich's rec-
ommendation that nations pay less attention to who owns finns and more 
attention to creating the economic conditions in which all firms will prosper, 
is tantamount to a call for governments to help bear the cost of setting up 
such networks. In effect, Reich recorrnnends that governments socialize search 
and deliberation costs for firms (foreign and domestic) through public goods 
expenditures, in order to help create national and regional business networks 
that rival those elsewhere.6 
One important implication of this is that FDI appears to have a greater 
stabilizing influence on national economies than some of its stronger propo-
nents have supposed. Indeed, FDI may be argued to move more inertly than 
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even domestic long-term investment flows, since domestic firms inherit a 
variety of home country advantages that enable them to move across different 
national business networks, providing them with consistently lower search 
and deliberation costs than foreign firms have in those same networks. To be 
competitive, then, foreign firms need to be more successful than domestic 
firms in internalizing search and deliberation costs, and consequently they 
need to be more committed to building up their involvement in the networks 
in which they participate. TNCs, then, should be quite reluctaut to exit from 
foreign locations in which they set up operations, and when they do find this 
their best course of action, it is likely that there are deeper causes at root 
having to do more with national economic policies than the liberalization of 
long-term capital flows. 
3.7 TheMAI 
There is currently no comprehensive set of international rules on FDI or the 
operations of TNCs comparable to the international rules for trade embodied 
in the WTO, and progress in multilateral negotiations on the subject has been 
modest at best. Issues relating to host country policies toward FDI and TNCs 
were first raised in GATT discussions in 1981, and by the time of the WTO 
Uruguay Round a limited set of trade-related investment measures (TRIMs) 
principally concerning local content restrictions had been agreed upon. Some-
what more success in the Uruguay Round carne about in connection with 
trade-related intellectual property policies (TRIPs), perhaps because develop-
ing countries were prepared to encourage technology transfers from developed 
countries. However, the perception of many in the industrial countries was 
that further progress in liberalizing capital flows was unlikely to occur within 
the WTO on account of the different interests of developed and developing 
countries (Graham, 1996). Accordingly, in 1994 an effort began to work out 
an agreement on investment within the OEeD, where it was believed there 
was greater commonality of interest. The collapse of negotiations over the 
MAl in late 1998 thus generated considerable pessimism not only about 
progress in liberalizing capital flows, but also in terms of where efforts ought 
to be initiated. All now seem to agree that limited negotiations hold the only 
prospect. Two proposals have been advanced for returning to the WTO as the 
proper venue for such negotiations, and relying on the WTO's 'built-in' 
agenda to avoid the need for authorizing any new initiatives. 
Moran (1998) has argued for restricting the agenda to performance re-
quirements and investment incentives within the context of the existing TRIMs 
agreement. The former are of particular concern to developed countries and 
the latter are of particular concern to developing countries. Thus in principle 
there is potential for an agreement with reciprocal concessions. But it is by 
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no means clear that the two sets of countries will be able to bargain as blocs. 
For example, developed countries include federal and non-federal forms of 
government. The former, p31ticularly the United States, have insisted Ihat 
tbey cannot compel subfederal governments (states) to restrict investment 
incentives. In addition, a number of developing countries appear unwilling to 
compromise on perfonnance requirements. 
Sauve and Wilkie (2000) have argued that a restricted agenda can be 
pursued through the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
by applying national treatment in services. They contend that the current 
GATS agreement is quite limited in scope, and that most countries' laws 
and policies that are inconsistent with national treatment are to be found in 
service industries covered by GATS (ef. R'ugman and Gestrin, 1994). Graham 
(2000) argues in favour of this initiative on the grounds that Ihe chief 
application of Ihe proposal would be to developed countries, between which 
it might be more realistic to seek agreements on the matter, and there 
appears to be a very considerable business constituency interested in serv-
ices liberalization. 
We favour progress on both these fronts, but think it is also possible to 
extend piecemeal refonn in venues additional to the WTO. In his diagnosis of 
Ihe Asian financial crisis, Eichengreen (1999) argues for a reform of interna-
tional financial intermediary and corporate practices that would increase 
banking and corporate transparency and disclosure through enhanced ac-
counting and auditing standards, establish capital requirements for foreign 
lending in line with risk, and generate new expectations regarding corporate 
governance. But Eichengreen does not suggest that the International Mon-
etary Fund or any other single international organization take on responsibility 
for all these changes. Rather, he believes a collection of private-sector bodies 
with appropriate expertise already exists, including: the International Ac-
counting Standards Committee (IASC), the International Organization of 
Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI), Committee J of Ihe International Bar 
Association (regarding bankruptcy laws), Ihe International Corporate Gov-
ernance Network (ICGN), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision 
(also cf. Daniels, 2000a, p. 127). 
Reform in the intelnational financial architecture generated by these 
groups and organizations would not in itself constitute a liberalization of 
international investment. But such reform would most likely create a more 
stable international climate for investment. On the one hand, such reform 
would ease information asymmetries that impede FDl. On the other hand, 
to the extent that national currencies were more stable as a result of such 
reforms, investment risk would be reduced. Thus, if only modest gains are 
now expected from negotiations over investment carried on in multilateral 
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organizations such as the WTO, these potential improvements in interna-
tional financial architecture may by comparison be important. There is a 
further reason to emphasize this avenue. Since the groups and organizations 
above are private-sector bodies, their deliberations and decisions are un-
likely to cause the sort of conflict that has been associated with the WTO. 
Moreover, should these groups and organizations be subject to public scru-
tiny, it is still arguable that their recommendations would not be controversial. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter we present a collection of stylized facts regarding structural 
changes and developments in the world economy in connection with trade, 
PDI, M&A, and their distribution across the TIiad and the ROW, and then 
provide an explanation of TNC strategies responding to and underlying these 
trends that emphasizes the transactions costs savings available to TNCs that 
become embedded in host economies. In our view, this picture provides good 
grounds for supposing that FDI and trade are substitutes and complements, 
and thus that the impact of FDI on trade balances should not be a primary 
policy concern. In the concluding section, then, we discuss policy toward 
FDI, and argue that the embeddedness of TNCs makes PDI a stabilizing 
factor in national economies. Despite this positive case, progress in liberaliz-
ing international capital flows has not been significant. We favour a set of 
piecemeal reforms, including changes in international financial architecture 
that stem from private-sector bodies. 
NOTES 
1. Globalization should be understood in terms of the interdependence of trade and invest-
ment within as well as between regions (Rugman, 2000). 
2. This relationship between FDI and trade in the case of Japan and the United States may be 
transient, since Japan appears to be moving from a bank-based system of corporate govern-
ance to a more securities-based system - a change which would have implications for 
Japanese FDI and trade (see Ozawa, 2000). 
3. However, the FDI relationship between the United Kingdom and Canada results in slightly 
lower trade flows than would have occurred without FDI taking place. 
4. The exceptions are Canada and Japan. Nor is the US case unreflective of the behaviour of 
non-US TNCs, with foreign content in sales by their US affiliates also in the neighbour-
hood of 10 per cent. 
5. Note that the issues often raised in connection with FDI to developing countries of labour 
exploitation and environmental dnmping are not relevant to the MAl, which was an agree-
ment being negotiated between developed countries. 
6. Here we see one of the important dimensions of Rugman's (2000) characterization of 
globalization as a process of regionalization. 
92 The World Trade Organization in the new global economy 
REFERENCES 
Bhagwati, J. and V. Dehejia (1994), 'Freer trade and wages of the unskilled - is Marx 
striking again?', in 1. Bhagwati and M, Kosters (cds), Trade and Wages: Leveling 
Wages Down?, Washington: American Enterprise Institute, pp. 36-75. 
Borenszstein, E., 1. De Gregorio and J. Lee (1994), How Does Foreign Direct Invest-
ment Affect Economic Growth?, Washington: International Monetary Fund Working 
Paper WP/94/11O. 
Braunstein, E. and G. Epstein (1999), 'Creating international credit rules and the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment: what arc the alternatives?', in 1. Michie and 
1.0. Smith (cds), Global Instability. The Political Economy a/World Governance, 
London: Routledge, pp. 113-33. 
Buckley, P. (1990), 'Problems and deve10pments in the core theory of international 
business', Journal of International Business Studies, 21 (4), pp. 657-65. 
Buckley, P. and M. Casson (1976), The Future of the Multinational Enterprise, 
London: Macmillan. 
Cantwell, J., T. Corley and J. Dunning (1986), 'An exploration of some historical 
antecedents to the modern theory of international production', in G. Jones and P. 
HeItner (cds), Multinationals: Theory and History, Farnborough: Gower. 
Chang, R. and A. Velasco (1998), 'The Asian liquidity crisis', Federal Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta Working Paper, no. 98-11. 
Coase, R. (1937), 'The nature of the firm', Economica, 4 (4). 
Daniels, J. (2000a), 'Global capital flows: maximising benefits, minimising risks', in 
Karl Kaiser, John Kirton and Joseph Daniels (eds), Shaping a New International 
Financial System: Challenges of Governance in a Globalizing World, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, pp. 113-33. 
Daniels, J. (2000b), 'The United States and global capital markets', in T. Brewer and 
G. Boyd (eds), Globalizing America: The USA in World Integration, Cheltenham, 
UK and Lyme, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 154-72. 
Davis, 1. and J. Daniels (2000), 'US corporations in globalization', in S. Cohen and 
G. Boyd (eds), Corporate Governance and Globalization: Long Range Planning 
Issues, Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, US: Edward Elgar, pp. 190-215. 
Dunning, J. (1958), American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry, London: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Dunning, J. (1977), 'Trade, location of economic activity, and the MNE: a search for 
an eclectic approach', in B. Ohlin, P.-O. Hesselborn, and P.M. Wijkman (eds), The 
International Allocation of Economic Activity, London: Macmillan. 
Dunning, J. (1981), International Production of Multinational Enterprises, London: 
Allen & Unwin. 
Dunning, 1. (1988), 'The eclectic paradigm of international production: an update 
and a reply to its critics', Journal of International Business Studies, 19 (1). 
Eichengreen, B. (1999), Toward a New International Financial Architecture: A Prac-
tical Post-Asia Agenda, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 
Fantagne, L. and M. Pajot (1997), 'How Foreign Direct Investment affects interna-
tional trade and competitiveness: an empiricaJ assessment', CEPII Workin.g Papers, 
November, no. 97-03. 
Feenstra, R. (1998), 'Integration of trade and disintegration of production in the 
global economy', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12 (4), pp. 31-50. 
Fortune (1991), 'Top 50 U.S. Exporters', Summer-Spring. 
Corporations and structural linkages in world commerce 93 
Glick, R. and A. Rose (1998), 'How do currency crises spread?', Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco Economic Letter, no. 98-25. 
Graham, E. (1996), Global Corporations and National Governments, Washington, 
DC: Institute for International Economics. 
Graham, E. (2000), Fighting the Wrong Enemy: Antiglobal Activists and Multina-
tional Enterprises, Washington: Institute for International Economics. 
Oranovetter, M. (1985), 'Economic action and social structure', American Journal of 
Sociology, 91 (November), pp. 481-510. 
Helliwell, J. (1998), How Much Do National Borders Matter?, Washington, DC: 
Brookings. 
Hymer, S. (1976), The International Operations of National Finns, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Kay, N. (1983), 'Review article: multinational enterprise', Scottish Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 30 (3). 
Moran, T. (1998), Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy 
Agenda for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, Washington: Insti-
tute for International Economics. 
Nadkarni, A. (1999), 'World Trade Liberalisation: national autonomy and global 
regulation', in J. Michie and J.O. Smith (cds), Global Instability. The Political 
Economy of World Governance, London: Routledge, pp. 134-50. 
DECD (2000), 'Recent trends in Foreign Direct Investment', Financial Market Trends, 
76 (June), pp. 23-41. 
Dhmae, K. (1990), Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy, 
New York: Harper. 
Ozawa, T. (2000), 'Japanese finns in deepening integration: evolving corporate gov-
ernance', in S. Cohen and O. Boyd (eds), Corporate Governance and Globalization: 
Long Range Planning Issues, Cheltenham, UK and Lyme, US: Edward Elgar, 
pp.216-44. 
Rangan, S. and R. Lawrence (1999), A Prism on Globalization: Corporate Responses 
to the Dollar, Washington, DC: Brookings. 
Reich, R. (1990), 'Who is usT, Harvard Business Review, January-February, pp. 53-
64. 
Rodrik, D. (1997), Has Globalization Gone Too Far?, Washington, DC: Institute for 
International Economics. 
Rugman, A. (1981), Inside the Multinationals: The Economics of Internal Markets, 
London: Croom Helm. 
Rugman, A. (2000), 'From globalisation to regionalism: the Foreign Direct Invest-
ment dimension of international finance', in K. Kaiser, J. Kirton, and J. Daniels 
(eds), Shaping a New International Financial System: Challenges of Governance 
in a Globalizing World, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 143-57. 
Rugman, A. and M. Oestrin (1994), 'NAFTA's treatment of foreign investment', in A. 
Rugman (ed.), Foreign Investment and NAFTA, Columbia, SC: University of South 
Carolina Press. 
Sauve, P. and C. Wilkie (2000), 'Investment liberalization in GATS', in P. Sauve and 
R. Stern (eds), GATS 2000: New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, 
Washington: Brookings. 
Swank, D. (1999), 'Global capital, democracy, and the welfare state: why political 
institutions are so important in shaping the domestic response to internationaliza-
tion', Working Paper 1.66, Center for International Studies, Harvard University, 
University of California Center for German and European Studies. 
94 The World Trade Organization in the new global economy 
United Nations Conference on Trade_ and Development (1999), World Investment 
Report 1999, New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2000), Handbook of Statis-
tics, New York and Geneva: United Nations. 
Wessel, David (2000), 'Cross-border mergers soared last year', Wall Street Journal, 
19 July, p. AIS. 
Williamson, I. and M. Mahar (1998), 'A survey of financial liberalization' ,Essays in 
International Finance, no. 211, Princeton: International Financial Section, Depart-
ment of Economics, Princeton University. 
Williamson, O. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implica-
tions, New York: Free Press. 
